risk management 2 it seemed as if directors would retain large compensations and payouts without any obligation to return or pay back the monies lost under their watch. 3 Directors' remuneration structures have therefore come under greater scrutiny.
Remuneration is important because to attract, retain and promote successful corporate activity, management talent must be incentivised and compensated appropriately. Good corporate governance (CG) expects that a Board when considering executive pay, must take cognisance of the challenges in the tasks executed by directors. 4 The question is whether directors' performance always measures up to their often hefty remuneration packages? There is strong evidence that inappropriate incentive structures played a role in the 2008 crisis. 5 Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and Nigeria provide good bases to assess efforts at balancing directors' remuneration with performance. The three jurisdictions share common-law foundations. Nigeria is a fast expanding hub of corporate activity in the African continent, it will provide some insight into the challenges emerging markets face in adopting strategies on executive remuneration. The UK has made significant effort in encouraging good corporate governance through domestic regulation 6 and the and supervised. That is, it is about mechanisms that ensure those who are in control are accountable. 12 Earlier scholars have also made attempts to define CG. much of what currently passes for the theory of corporate governance and which forms the foundation of regulatory policy is based on a description of forces, relationships and actors that holds very little similarity to the way that the real world operates. 14 An aspect of CG which has attracted the attention of regulatory policy is the issue of directors' or executive remuneration or compensation. 15 Executive compensation is a key part of CG because it determines the incentives of the directors not only as to size but also to the structure of such compensation package. 16 The compensation package may consist of all or some of the following components: short term base salary and annual bonus; and long-term stock and stock options, insurance, pension benefits and severance pay. companies to adopt proper compensation schemes and where (improper) schemes such as the "Golden Handshake", are used, to have mechanisms for reclaiming these compensation packages via "claw back polices". Section II examines compensation schemes and processes to claw back improper compensation. Section III analyses the different forms of incentive plans, while Section IV considers the broad issue of directors' remuneration and reforms. Section V evaluates the challenges in measuring performance for remuneration purposes. The paper concludes in section VI.
II. COMPENSATION SCHEMES
Compensation plays a key role in motivating directors to ensure their efficient monitoring of management and to produce high standards of performance of the company. 18 If the key objective of CG is to ensure the sustainability and performance of a company in line with the interest of its stakeholders, it is only reasonable that directors' compensation packages should be sufficient stimulus for those who are to pursue this objective. We agree that the performance of a company is hinged on its compensation environment as per the size of pay, 19 and that compensation has to be appropriately designed if it is to motivate directors towards effective leadership and governance. In addition, the size of the board, the size of the company, familiarity between the members of the board, the managers and the major shareholders, the attraction and retention of executives are all contributory factors in the determination of an appropriate compensation scheme. 22 From the results of interviews carried out by Bender and Moir, there must be a balance between the affected parties as regards the compensation scheme of the executives. 23 Those who determine directors' compensation have to make fair considerations as to the interests of others given that the executive is paid from the residual profit of the company and excessive compensation reduces the profit of the company. 24 It appears that there is no generally accepted way of determining the appropriateness of executive compensation. 25 In practice, the market in which the company finds itself is used as a benchmark in determining executive pay and its levels of bonus and long term awards. This will include the other members of the Board, shareholders, employees, other officers of the company, and some other stakeholders including the opinion of regulatory bodies where applicable. Weak regulatory and enforcement mechanisms and the relatively mild punishment that has accompanied previous corporate scandals in the country are also important factors.
29
Disinterest or lack of informed awareness of shareholders also mean that they exert little control over directors' activities. A nascent corporate culture and lack of management expertise by directors as to proper board processes and conduct may also be a contributory factor in malpractices related to remuneration.
30
In Australia, paying reasonable remuneration to directors of a company is an exception to the rule requiring shareholders' approval for payment of financial benefits to a related third party under the Australian Corporations Law. handshakes; any part of a compensation or golden handshake which takes the overall taxable income to $180,000 will be taxed at the normal marginal tax rate.
37

A. Reclaiming improper compensation: Claw back policies
Pauline Renaud has suggested that companies should include clawback clauses or policies in their remuneration policies in the fight to curb reward for failure. 38 For this to work, it has to be proved that the executive has misbehaved or there is material error or; the company has suffered or is suffering a material downturn of performance or; the company suffers a material failure of risk management. In any of these circumstances, the Bank of England proposes that bankers will be forced to give back cash for up to six years after they have received or spent it.
39
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) came up with a consultation paper on reforming the UK CG Code and of the three issues from which feedbacks were expected one was the issue of clawback policies. by cutting its bonus pools and reclaiming compensation. It appears that the position of the UK is that it would rather claw back compensations made as a result of failure than cap executive pay.
41
In Australia, the government's legislation has a dual policy on compensation. First, companies are required to disclose the pay package of executives and second, companies are required to ensure that bonuses can be clawed back in situations where the financial existence of the company have been falsified. 
III. INCENTIVES
In the UK, executive compensation is typically comprised of base salary, annual bonus element and long term pay which consists of share options and LTIPs. 50 Since the UK requires detailed disclosure on executive compensation practices, it is perhaps more probable that the disclosed pay of the directors is determined based on the performance of the company.
51
Nevertheless as a response to the culture of rewarding poor or bad performance, the EU parliament came up with a resolution to fix a bonus cap which aims to put a lid on annual performance related bonuses of executive.
52
The bonus cap will make changes to the way remuneration is structured, that is, from salary annual bonus and LTIP, to schemes that are expected to comprise salaries, share allowances and bonuses. 53 The UK government has so far resisted this cap on the argument that in the UK at least, executives are rewarded for success. 54 In order to circumvent the EU bonus cap which limits bonuses to 100 per cent of annual salaries or 200 per cent with shareholder approval, financial executives get more share payments as remuneration. With UK's exit (Brexit) from the EU following the 2016 referendum, the impact of further EU proposals is debatable.
In Australia, the issue of executive directors' pay has received the interest of both the Australian public and the policy makers including the ASX. 56 The level of pay and the relationship of pay to performance have also come under scrutiny. 57 The ASX recommends that a relationship between remuneration and performance should be created and aligned and also be clearly disclosed to investors. 58 This suggests that in Australia there is a recognised link between remuneration and performance however Merhebi et al find that contrary to international evidence which suggests that executive pay is significantly correlated with company performance, the Australian situation is that the performance of companies is inconsistent with the pay of executives.
59
In Nigeria, Obatan opines that executives of companies can only be motivated to work through financial incentives because by the nature of their positions, they are not promoted or promotable and therefore look to incentives to perform. 60 This suggests that motivation by incentives is fundamental to performance. One is not sure whether this is the case. So long as the company remains a going concern whether or not it makes losses consecutively or performs poorly compared to previous reports, there is no evidence to suggest that the director in the Nigerian jurisdiction will lose any agreed 
A. Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs)
One of the advantages of LTIPs is that it provides a direct link between performance and executive pay. 63 LTIPs are awarded to executives both as an incentive to improve performance and in order to reduce fixed costs. They include: share option plans and bonuses linked to long term performance. 64 In Australia, there has been a shift in the mix of executive pay structure from fixed salary to LTIPs and STIPs. happened when in 2012 the shareholders of National Australia Bank voted on whether the CEO will be awarded a sum more than $2.7 million if he can take the company into the top quarter of its peer group by 2016. This fixation of pay with performance by demanding that the director achieve a set goal is a major reason why LTIPs have become increasingly popular in Australia. 66 In 2010, the three most influential companies in Australia structured their remuneration plans to be more shareholder friendly. The Commonwealth Bank, Argo Investments and BHP Billiton have increased and now calculate their LTIPs both for four years and five years respectively indicating that LTIPs are shareholder-friendly and are welcomed.
67
In addition, the Australian Institute of Company Directors has created guidelines for executive share and option scheme deadlines (LTIPs). It recommends that there should be a reasonable structure for incentive schemes designed around appropriate performance benchmarks that measure performance and provide rewards that will improve the company's future performance. 68 Despite the fact that it is becoming popular, this approach to determining LTIPs has been criticised on the basis that companies will need to consider the peculiar nature of their business operations or In the UK, the approach to STIPs is also performance and target based. Lamy and Goldin comment that business incentives have shifted to shorter-term focus as importance is attached more to market accounting, quarterly returns and short-term incentive or annual bonuses. core of criticisms on directors' pay in the UK. An instance is that of the Co-op bank which announced losses and was still paying its executives bonuses; the Bank despite recovering from a scandal had plans to lay off up to 5,000 employees while making bonus pay-outs to senior staff. 84 In Nigeria the limitation of STIPs is seem more clearly where STIPs which are supposed to be performance-based distort performance as directors and executives use these STIPs to disguise excessive pay. 85 Olisaemeka observes in this regard that the Nigeria Capital Market was not seen as a market for the long term but as a short term one because majority of the companies listed on it were chasing short term goals and rewarding their executive on STIPs. based on share returns, accounting profitability and bonus pays. 89 Contrary to this view is the commonly held notion that for a company to be successful, it should link pay to performance, as pay is deemed essential in encouraging all round performance. 90 Brown and Heywood argue that there is need to consider the importance of the economic, institutional and cultural background of countries in deciding performance related pay schemes or incentives.
91
Janet Lee also notes that PRIs are not just related to the level of performance of the company but also relate to the change in performance and all of this relates to the ownership concentration, board structure and firm size.
92
In Australia, there has been a shift in executive pay following the US model, with a growing emphasis on short and LTI payments.
93
The same can be said about the UK: companies tend to grant less share options to their executives leading to lower appreciation of LTIPs.
94
In practice however it seems UK companies are more concerned with how much of an incentive should be awarded rather than whether a PRI payment has been earned in the first place. 95 The result of this is that despite the incentive schemes, remuneration systems tend to sway towards the traditional fixed pay. are to be used, such PRIs must be identified, based on individual performance and the incentive must be feasible for the company to implement.
97
The Nigerian SEC Code requires that the remuneration policy of a company should explain how rewards of senior management and executives are linked to both corporate and individual performance.
98
This provision may further embolden shareholder participation although the extent to which PRIs are included as part of compensation schemes is not always readily available from public records. "directors' compensation is positively related to pre-dated shareholder returns and company size with the quantitative effect of the latter dominating the former." 100 Under UK law however, the director is an officer of the company and he or she has no right of remuneration unless the company's articles state so.
99
IV. DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION AND REFORMS
101
The approach in Australia is not too different. Kym Sheehan points out that the regulatory framework for executive remuneration is not determined by the government, which means that there are no models like that of the UK.
102
Remuneration practice is therefore gleaned from the remuneration contract, its execution and termination. 103 The main source of the right a director has to remuneration is found in the company's Articles and where there is no such clause, the alternative rule in the Australian Corporation Act provides that the director will be paid such remuneration and expenses as determined by the general meeting of the members. There is a requirement for a non-binding (advisory) shareholder resolution to be put at a listed company's AGM that the remuneration report be adopted." 25 per cent or more disapproval from its shareholders. Subsequently, there will be a 'spill meeting' requiring persons who were directors at the time the disapproved remuneration report was considered to stand for re-election. The rationale behind this law according to the Australian government is to provide an additional level of accountability, disclosure and transparency in deciding and reporting remuneration of directors and executives.
117
B. UK Reforms
The concerns of the UK on executive remuneration are: the size of the basic pay; the large gains and the compensation payments to directors on loss of office. 
C. Nigerian Reforms
The Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) provides that even where the Articles have fixed the remuneration of directors it can still be altered by the shareholders at the company's general meeting. 124 It states that where the directors receive remuneration not approved by the shareholders, they may be liable for misfeasance and will be accountable. Ibid, s267(6).
126
Committee headed by Atedo Peterside (OON) mandated to identify weaknesses in current corporate governance practices in Nigeria. reason for this lack of action was that the issue of executive compensation in Nigeria was not at the heart or the principal cause of the financial crisis in Nigeria unlike other countries around the world and that comparison between the UK and Nigeria on the issue of remuneration is unfounded.
139
V. MEASURING PERFORMANCE FOR REMUNERATION PURPOSES
The UK CG Code places importance on the relationship between company performance and executive pay and recognizes the value of performance evaluation in this context. 140 The Code states that there should be annual evaluation of the Board which will determine its. in shareholder's interests and deliver long term economic growth that will benefit society as a whole.
142
Some suggest evaluation has an impact on remuneration.
143
It is important to point out at this point that there is a dilemma here, one of time. Directors' remuneration packages are usually agreed at the start of the financial year or prior to commencement of office; a subsequent appraisal may or may not highlight a failure or a potential crisis if the auditors do not testify to this. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not poor performance was due to "bad luck" or poor decisions. UK. Under the Guidelines for Executive Remuneration contained in the ASX principles and recommendations, performance based remuneration which is a component of executive remuneration, should be linked to specified performance targets and the way this can be done is through proper board evaluation or appraisal.
147
The ASX Principles and Recommendations in addition recommend that the company should introduce key performance indicators for executives' measure of achievement of objectives and link part of it to their remuneration. 148 In Nigeria, the SEC Code recommends that the board of directors should establish a system to evaluate its own performance annually.
149
From the Code, the purpose of any evaluation or appraisal is mainly for training and for purposes of determining reelection. 150 The CBN Code offers a more transparent provision: that banks should carry out a performance appraisal and this appraisal should be done by an outside consultant whose appointment and termination should be approved by the shareholders at an AGM. 151 It does not appear that at least at present, performance appraisal is accorded much importance in Nigerian companies. Where they are carried out, performance appraisals or evaluations are not conducted in relation to remuneration; they are conducted primarily on an evaluative basis and there is no further obligation on communicating the results of the appraisal to the shareholders.
A. The Appeal of Audits and Disclosure Requirements
Certain factors can impact the performance of the directors. These include the board of directors,
153
as the size of the board increases, the pay of the executives also increase.
154
Unless there is sufficient independence and competence on the board itself, the company may suffer and reward for its executives will be provided regardless.
155
The size of the company also matters as corporation size can be a partial representation of managerial ability.
156
In our view, audit reports and disclosure requirements present a good means of measuring performance. In Australia, it has been recommended that reports on incentive measures must reflect the risks inherent in these measures as well.
157
On this basis, the ASIC has reiterated the need to ensure that risk reporting which is done through the audit committee remains of high quality. In Nigeria the audit committees are more focused on the financial performance of the company as a whole, and not the performance of the board. 160 However, audit reports may impact remuneration in future, because if the company is not doing well and this is publicly disclosed in the audited accounts, excessive rewards for directors can be countered on available evidence.
With regard to disclosure, in practice, shareholders, the media and the general public can only rely on what is reported or disclosed. Contrary to the intended aims, it can argued that increased disclosure can cause problems. Greater disclosure can mean the greater likelihood of executives comparing their remuneration with those of others which can only serve to inflate remuneration generally. 161 On the other hand, executives may not be keen to let the public know just how much they earn as directors.
The Australian Corporations Act lays down requirements on the specific information companies must disclose on their remuneration. 162 There is a further requirement that time be allocated to discussing remuneration of executives at the general meeting which 159 will be voted on by the shareholder. 163 In Nigeria, the CAMA has mandatory provisions regarding proper disclosure. 164 Audit committees are charged with ensuring that there is proper compliance with disclosure requirements relating to the remuneration of executives and the highly paid staff of the company. 165 This provision has not made much impact and for banks in particular, the lack of transparency and disclosure of financial transactions has led to increased financial crimes. 166 Furthermore, the contradictory approaches of the national law under CAMA and the bank (CBN) and market Codes (SEC) in Nigeria, do not help. Since the CAMA does not appear to have strong enforcement mechanism and poor regulatory oversight, executives can deliberately refuse to properly disclose certain information required by the Nigerian Accounting Standard Board. 167 According to Nat Ofo, the deficiencies in the Nigerian SEC Code also contribute to this. The SEC Code does not demand full disclosure of the remuneration and breakdown of executive remuneration. This is a loophole that creates an avenue for poor monitoring of the boards' activities. provisions on disclosure of remuneration recommend that the company's interests are put before private interest. 169 Ejuvbekpokpo and Esuike recommend that in the absence of strong political and institutional framework, disclosure must be compulsory and compliance enforced if it is to be of any effect.
170
The growing Nigerian market requires even stronger models of transparency and accountability. Disclosure of company accounts, appropriate, accessible and accurate information on relevant company matters as required by the CAMA and disclosure of directors remuneration, serve to alert shareholders and the wider public on company performance. These ultimately provide a yardstick to evaluate if only on a broad basis, the contribution directors make to the company in justification of their pay. Timely disclosure is also very important in the Nigerian context; much of the information on vital issues are reported in the media and accessed via media networks -they may not be recorded in academic or research material. It becomes even more difficult to access information when it is not provided and discussed at the time there is public interest in receiving same.
It is important to bear in mind that the environment and business culture also matters when considering directors' performance. The business environments in the UK and 
VI. CONCLUSION
Australia is in our view the most progressive of the three jurisdictions with respect to efficient corporate governance action over directors' pay. There is a mandatory tone to its executive remuneration provisions and disclosure of directors' remuneration is prioritized. The UK for its part is gradually moving towards granting shareholders more power in deciding executives' pay although time will tell what shareholders will make of the authority given to them. Intervention is still political it is either when a company has failed or is on the brink of failure, that CEOs are summoned before the House of Parliament. This approach is not sufficient since the intervention comes after the deed has been done and the executives can come up with a proper justification for their reward. A preventive approach will be more appropriate that is, regulatory provisions that asks questions where there is evidence of poor performance for example in audited corporate accounts for each financial year.
The major problem we found in examining practice in Nigeria was the lack of strong institutional infrastructure on corporate governance. However since the global efforts at recovery from the 2008 crisis and with a return to democracy, greater media and public scrutiny has ensured that there is growing awareness about company executives' responsibility to work for their huge pay. Intervention has been limited to the actions of the Central Bank as previously discussed and corporate directors have not been reprimanded on the grounds of excessive remuneration, but for fraud and similar crimes.
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Regardless of the level of corporate activity in a jurisdiction, strategies taking into account the reward for performance given to directors, is imperative to sustain confidence in the market. It is also vital for the maintenance of transparency and accountability in the corporate sector. For emerging economies like Nigeria in particular, more efficient corporate governance processes including stronger regulatory oversight over directors' pay and performance can strengthen investment and efficiency in the corporate sector.
This is under the authority of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Nigeria. The Commission publishes details of its investigations and arrests on its web site: https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/.
